





















































































































































What’s Behind Volatile Import Prices
from China?
Mary Amiti and Donald R. Davis
In a sharp departure from earlier trends, the price of U.S. imports 
from China rose 6 percent in the 2006-08 period. To explore the 
forces behind this surprising increase, the authors create a new 
import index that uses highly disaggregated data to track price 
developments in different product types. The index reveals that the 
largest price increases were concentrated in industrial supplies—
goods that rely heavily on commodity inputs. The authors 
conclude that the surge in commodity prices through mid-2008 
was the primary driver of the rising import prices from China.
P
rices of U.S. imports from China increased 7 percent from the beginning of 
2007 through August 2008. Although the prices edged down in the fall, lower-
ing the overall increase for the 2006-08 period to 6 percent, the long upswing 
in prices represented a sharp reversal of previous price trends and challenged the 
customary view of China as a wellspring of low-priced goods. It also raised concerns 
because China’s position as the largest single supplier of U.S. imports—accounting 
for 20 percent of non-oil imports—meant that the price hikes could have far-reaching 
consequences for U.S. businesses and consumers.
The press initially speculated that rising Chinese wages were behind the price 
increases,1 and subsequent news reports cited shifts in exchange rates and raw 
material prices as additional factors.  In fact, however, it has been difﬁ  cult to identify 
the forces driving the price rises. The primary source of information on the price 
movements of Chinese imports—a monthly price index compiled by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS)—covers just the past ﬁ  ve years and presents only aggregate 
ﬁ  gures for Chinese imports as a whole.  It does not track price movements for indi-
vidual product types over time—information that might shed light on the causes 
of the rise in import prices. 
In this edition of Current Issues, we construct a new price index to obtain a better 
understanding of the behavior of Chinese import prices. Our new index uses highly 
disaggregated data that allow us to decompose the overall price index for Chinese 
imports into three end-use categories: industrial supplies, capital goods, and consumer 
goods. In addition, the index includes data going back to 1997, making it possible to 
follow price movements over a longer period. 
A key revelation of the new index is that imports of Chinese industrial supplies 
showed the largest price increase over the 2006-08 period, while the prices of consumer 
and capital goods moved up only modestly. Since oil and raw materials are critical 
inputs in industrial supplies, we can infer that the dominant force behind higher U.S. 
import prices from China was the steep run-up in oil and commodity prices. With the 
1  See, for example, Keith Bradsher, “Wages Are on the Rise in China as Young Workers Grow Scarce,” New York 
Times, August 29, 2007, late edition.2
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longer time series, the data also reveal that the upturn in consumer 
goods prices coincided with the rise of the Chinese renminbi 
against the U.S. dollar, suggesting that the appreciation of the 
Chinese currency was also a contributing factor. The rising wages 
of Chinese workers, though identiﬁ  ed by the press as an important 
source of the price increases, proves on closer examination to be 
of scant importance.
Measuring Import Prices
Each month, the Bureau of Labor Statistics publishes an aggregate 
U.S. import price index that averages price movements across 
all source countries. The aggregate index is in turn divided into 
separate indexes by type of goods imported, referred to as end-use 
categories. In addition, the BLS computes a separate price index 
for some source countries, including China. These country-speciﬁ  c 
indexes, however, are not broken out by end-use categories.
The BLS began publishing its index of Chinese import prices 
relatively recently, in December 2003. From the start of the 
sample through the end of 2006, the price index fell from 100 to 
97, showing a 3 percent decline in prices (Chart 1). Beginning in 
2007, however, it reversed itself and rose to 103.8 by August 2008, 
thus showing a 7 percent increase over this period. Although the 
index has declined recently, by 0.8 percent between August and 
November 2008, the overall rise of 6 percent in Chinese import 
prices over a two-year period represented a worrisome departure 
from earlier trends for U.S. ﬁ  rms and consumers accustomed to 
inexpensive goods from China.
To explore the forces behind these price increases, we construct 
a new index that tracks import prices from China for a longer time 
period, going back to 1997, and we then decompose the index by 
product type (see the discussion of our methodology in the box). 
Our calculations draw on unit value data, deﬁ  ned as the ratio of 
the import value of a particular product to the quantity of U.S. 
imports from China. To be sure, the use of unit value data to 
construct price indexes has a drawback, since the data make no 
adjustment for the quality and composition of goods. Thus, the 
indexes might overstate inﬂ  ation if quality has improved or 
the composition of imports has shifted toward higher priced 
goods. Recognizing this drawback, we seek to minimize the 
compositional changes within a product category by using the 
Empirical Methodology
Our calculation of the growth in the import price index (MPI) is based 
on the Tornqvist formula:a
MPIt          = i,t               , where wi,t = 0.5¾(sharei,t + share i,t-1).
The unit value uvi,t is deﬁ  ned as the ratio of the value of non-oil 
manufactured imports to the quantity of imports for each Harmonized 
System (HS) ten-digit product code i at year t. For product i to be 
included in the construction of the index at period t, the product must 
be imported from China in both period t and t-1. Each HS ten-digit 
product code imported from China is weighted (wi,t) by taking the 
average share of imports of product i in period t (sharei,t) and period t-1 
(sharei,t-1). Thus the basket of goods changes from period to period, as 
do the weights. b The formula gives the changes in import prices from 
period to period. To calculate the import price index series, we cumulate 
the MPI, obtaining the levels of the price index plotted in our charts.
We construct the import price index by end-use category in the 
same way after dividing the non-oil manufacturing HS ten-digit 
categories into three end-use categories—industrial supplies, capital 
goods, and consumer goods—using an ofﬁ  cial concordance from the 
U.S. Census Bureau. Note that we exclude from our analysis the separate 
end-use category for automotive vehicles and parts because it comprises 
less than 5 percent of imports from China. For each of the three end-use 
categories, we construct an import price index using the above formula. 
This methodology differs from that of the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS). To construct the international import price indexes, the BLS 
adopts a Laspeyres-type formula that uses historical annual weights 
lagged by two years. The basket of goods used by the BLS changes over 
the period, as do the weights given each product. The Laspeyres formula 
computed with the unit value data as inputs yields the same conclusions 
as the Tornqvist formula; however, it produces more pronounced 
aggregate price increases. An advantage of using the Tornqvist index is 
that it corrects for the tendency of consumers to purchase lower quanti-
ties of goods whose relative price has risen. Thus, it is closer to a true 
cost-of-living index than is the Laspeyres index.
a See Diewert (1993) for a description of the various types of indexes.
b When we kept the basket of goods the same for the whole period, the 
sample of products was reduced considerably. This approach yielded the 





Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
Note: The BLS introduced its import price index for China in December 2003.
Chart 1
Import Prices from China
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most disaggregated data available—the ten-digit classiﬁ  cations 
of the Harmonized System (HS). These classiﬁ  cations comprise 
more than 16,000 product codes in total, of which about 8,000 
apply to goods imported from China by the United States. To get a 
sense of the level of disaggregation in the data, consider that there 
are more than sixty different product codes for textile carpets, 
each specifying whether the carpet is of manmade ﬁ  ber, what 
type of material is used, and so forth. 
The sample of goods used in our index is considerably larger 
than the sample used in the BLS index for China. Although the 
BLS indexes have the attraction of using actual price quotes from 
ﬁ  rm surveys, the BLS import price index for China comprises 
only about 3,000 products, with 2,000 actual price quotes col-
lected for any given month. 
The general reliability of our unit value data is borne out 
by the fact that, for the aggregate U.S. import price index we 
construct for goods from all countries exporting to the United 
States, the unit value data closely track the BLS aggregate price 
index (Chart 2).2 Similarly, if we compare our unit value index for 
China with the corresponding BLS price index (Chart 3), we ﬁ  nd 
that the two indexes tell broadly similar stories: both measures 
show an initial decline in import prices from China, followed by 
an increase. However, two important differences emerge in the 
data: the unit value data show an earlier turning point, 2005 rather 
than 2006, and a sharper recent escalation of import prices. 
2  Our unit value price index is computed using annual rather than monthly data. This 
approach has the advantage of smoothing out erratic price movements stemming from 
the irregular timing of shipments—that is, the fact that each product is not imported 
every month from China. Moreover, in order to compare the BLS index with our unit 
value measures, we average the BLS monthly data to create an annual time series.
China Import Prices by Category
The unit value data permit a simple but revealing division of the 
imports from China into the three broad end-use categories used 
by the BLS in its aggregate U.S. import price index: consumer 
goods, capital goods, and industrial supplies.3 In 2007, consumer 
and capital goods together accounted for approximately 85 percent 
of U.S. imports from China, and industrial supplies accounted for 
the remaining 15 percent. 
An analysis of trends in import prices in each end-use cate-
gory shows that the largest increases from China since 2004 were 
in the industrial supplies category (Chart 4). By contrast, the 
increases in consumer and capital goods prices were consider-
ably more modest. These ﬁ  ndings raise the question, Why were 
industrial supplies such a distinctive and important contributor 
to the rise in Chinese prices? 
A Surge in Commodity and Oil Prices
The large role of industrial supplies in boosting Chinese import 
prices relates closely to the composition of these goods. The 
industrial supplies category comprises intermediate inputs such 
as paper products, building materials, and metals and nonmetals 
related to durable goods. These products are made from com-
modities such as cotton, rubber, wool, plastics, chemicals, fuels, 
wood, glass, steel, and iron. Commodity and oil prices, of course, 
also rose steeply over the period examined in this study, as seen 
in Chart 5, where we plot the industrial supplies import price 
index against a commodity price index and the dollar price of 
3  We exclude fuels from the industrial supplies category. However, industrial supplies 
also incorporate plastics, which are fuel-intensive.
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS); U.S. Census 
Bureau; authors’ calculations.
Note: Values for 2008 are averages of monthly data through October 2008.
Chart 2
Comparison of BLS Index and Unit Value Index: 
Price of Imports from All Countries
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Sources: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS); U.S. Census 
Bureau; authors’ calculations.
Note: Values for 2008 are averages of monthly data through October 2008.
Chart 3
Comparison of BLS Index and Unit Value Index: 
Price of Imports from China
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West Texas intermediate (WTI) crude oil. The turning point in the 
industrial supplies index—between 2002 and 2003—coincides 
both with the turning point for non-fuel commodity prices (“raw 
industrial commodities”) and with the step-up in the growth rate 
of oil prices. Of course, these series do not match exactly, because 
other factors also affect the overall behavior of prices.4 Neverthe-
4  For example, China provides oil and fuel subsidies that help cushion some of the 
world commodity price increases, reducing the growth of costs for the producers of 
industrial supplies.
less, the series movements are broadly “in sync,” suggesting that 
the surge in oil and commodity prices was instrumental in driving 
up import prices of China’s industrial supplies.
If the upswing in oil and commodity prices does indeed help 
to explain the rise in these prices, we would also expect to see 
an increase in U.S. import prices for industrial supplies from 
countries other than China. The reason is that oil and commodity 
price increases are a global development; hence, they should exert 
upward pressure on the prices of industrial supplies throughout 
the world. In Chart 6, we compare U.S. import prices of industrial 
supplies from China with those from the rest of the world for the 
same product codes. As the chart shows, import prices of indus-
trial supplies from the rest of the world also climbed sharply 
during our sample period. Of course, rapid growth in China may 
be a contributing factor to the rise in commodity prices because 
of increased demand. But insofar as the price of industrial supplies 
is also rising rapidly outside China, an important determinant 
of the increase in Chinese import prices is a global, rather than a 
China-speciﬁ  c, phenomenon.
The Role of Exchange Rates in the Import Price Rise
As we noted earlier, import prices for consumer and capital 
goods from China also rose in recent years, though the increases 
were of smaller magnitude than those observed for industrial 
supplies. One factor that may have contributed to the higher 
prices of these goods was the appreciation of the Chinese cur-
rency. The renminbi began to strengthen against the U.S. dollar 
in 2005, the same year that import prices for both consumer and 
capital goods started to increase. Since 2005, the dollar/renminbi 
exchange rate has risen more than 20 percent. 
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau; authors’ calculations.
Note: Values for 2008 are averages of monthly data through October 2008.
Chart 4
Comparison of Import Price Indexes for Consumer Goods, 
Capital Goods, and Industrial Supplies
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Industrial Supplies Import Prices from China 
and World Commodity Prices
WTI price (dollars) Price index (2004 = 100)
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Sources: U.S. Census Bureau; authors’ calculations.
Note: Values for 2008 are averages of monthly data through October 2008.
Chart 6
Comparison of Industrial Supplies Prices: 
China and Rest of World
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The appreciation of the renminbi relative to the dollar creates 
pressure for the dollar prices of Chinese goods to rise. This “pass-
through” of the exchange rate change to dollar prices, however, 
need not be one for one. That is, if the exchange rate rises by 
10 percent, the dollar price of goods might rise by less than 
10 percent. The degree of pass-through would depend on market 
features such as the extent of competition from non-Chinese 
export sources and the prevalence of existing contracts that lock 
in particular dollar prices. In addition, it would depend on the 
extent to which the costs underlying Chinese exports indeed re-
ﬂ  ected value added in China. Since intermediate inputs imported 
to China account for a large share of the value of its exports, the 
price of these imports would also reﬂ  ect China’s exchange rate 
with the countries from which it imports intermediate goods. 
While such factors complicate exchange rate pass-through, 
the renminbi appreciation clearly coincided with increases in 
import prices. Chart 7 plots the evolution of the dollar/renminbi 
exchange rate from 1997 to date against the price movements of 
our three categories of imports.  The contemporaneous move-
ment of the exchange rate and broad prices for consumer goods, 
capital goods, and industrial supplies is quite apparent. Chart 8 
shows that this pattern is widespread across broad subcategories 
of consumer goods prices: import prices of almost all these sub-
categories increased between 2005 and 2008, when the exchange 
rate was rising. The two exceptions—apparel and telecoms—are 
easily explained. The divergent price movements for apparel 
imports reﬂ  ect the existence of import quotas: the prices declined 
between 2004 and 2005 before beginning to rise in 2005 after 
import quotas were lifted.5 The import prices of telecom prod-
ucts (such as videos and televisions) fell throughout the sample 
period because technological advances and productivity gains 
kept unit costs down.  
Increasing Wages in China 
A third factor that could have driven the higher import prices 
from China—cited often in early press coverage of this topic—
is the rise in Chinese workers’ wages. For given markups over 
marginal cost, increasing wages will account for the observed 
higher prices when two conditions hold. First, the wage increases 
must outpace productivity increases, so that unit costs are rising. 
Second, the wage component of the total cost for exports must be 
high. Although reliable unit labor cost data for China are difﬁ  cult 
to obtain, the ofﬁ  cial statistics do indicate annual wage increases 
of 15 percent over the last few years. However, it appears that the 
labor share of export costs is not high enough to account for a 
signiﬁ  cant part of the price rises.6 
Consider, for example, the breakdown of total costs for a boot 
manufacturer in China (Chart 9). Material inputs account for 
nearly three-fourths of the manufacturer’s export costs, while 
labor represents a mere 8 percent. Further evidence of labor’s 
limited role is provided by ﬁ  rm-level data in Chart 10 that show 
how Chinese exporters’ wage bills varied as a share of total sales 
value across the distribution of ﬁ  rms in 2004. Ninety percent of 
the nearly 8,000 ﬁ  rms in the sample had labor cost shares at or 
below 20 percent of total sales revenue. The most prevalent labor 
5  See Barrows and Harrigan (forthcoming) on the effect of lifting import quotas on 
apparel from China. 
6  Consistent with our ﬁ  ndings, a survey by Deutsche Bank (2008) in March revealed that 
50 percent of exporting ﬁ  rms surveyed in China identiﬁ  ed raw material costs as the key 
factor driving down proﬁ  t margins and only 13 percent identiﬁ  ed labor costs as a factor. 
Sources: Bank for International Settlements; U.S. Census Bureau; authors’ calculations.
Notes: Values for 2008 price indexes are averages of monthly data through October 2008.
The 2008 value  for the dollar/renminbi exchange rate is the average exchange rate for
October of that year. 
  
Chart 7
Dollar/Renminbi Exchange Rate and Import Price Indexes 
for Consumer Goods, Capital Goods, and Industrial Supplies
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Note: Values for 2008 are averages of monthly data through October 2008.
Chart 8
Disaggregated Indexes of Consumer Goods Prices
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cost share was just 5 percent.7 These ﬁ  ndings clearly indicate that 
even relatively strong wage growth in China is likely to have only 
a very modest impact on prices. 
7  Of course, some of the materials are domestically purchased, and so incorporate 
labor costs from China. But a large share of China’s exports is “processing trade”—the   
practice of assembling duty-free inputs for export—which usually involves a large 
share of imported inputs. See Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2008).
It is also important to consider whether the pace of wage 
changes has varied over time. Holding all other factors equal, 
we would expect a marked change in the path of import prices 
from China if there were a signiﬁ  cant change in the growth rate 
of wages. While the annual growth rate of wages has been in the 
range of 12 to 15 percent according to ofﬁ  cial Chinese statistics, 
there has been only a modest acceleration in the growth rate of 
wages, on the order of 3 percent over a two-year period (from 
15 percent in 2006 to 18 percent in 2007).8 Given the relatively 
low weight of wages in total costs, this small boost would fall far 
short of explaining the rising import prices from China. 
Changing Product Mix and Rising Product Quality
Before we conclude our inquiry into movements in Chinese im-
port prices, we need to ask whether the observed price increases 
actually reﬂ  ect higher prices for a given body of goods. Could it 
instead be the case that the increases are due to the import of 
higher quality goods or to changes in the composition of imports 
at a level too ﬁ  ne to be captured in the import price data? 
As we noted earlier, it is not possible to adjust for quality 
changes when unit value data are used. Thus, in principle, the 
observed import price increases could stem from quality up-
grading. However, given the pattern of price increases we have 
observed, this explanation seems unlikely. If quality upgrading 
were the driving force, the largest price increases would not be 
concentrated in industrial supplies—material-intensive goods 
that exhibit only small quality differentials at best. Instead, 
we would expect to see price increases in the consumer goods 
category that were similar to or even larger than those in indus-
trial supplies. However, as our index has shown, the rise in prices 
for consumer goods has been quite modest. 
Evidence is also lacking for the notion that higher import 
prices from China merely reﬂ  ect the changing composition of the 
goods imported. Certainly, there have been dramatic changes in 
the broad composition of imports from China.9 Footwear and 
clothing as a share of total manufactured imports from China 
have declined, from 60 percent in 1997 to 38 percent in 2007, 
while the share of machinery has grown from 29 percent in 1997 
to 38 percent in 2007.10 Nevertheless, when we keep the basket 
of goods ﬁ  xed over the whole period, our import price index for 
China shows a larger increase than when we allow the basket 
to change to take account of new goods. Thus, it is doubtful that 
the composition of imports has shifted toward higher priced 
goods. Indeed, telecoms, the goods category with the largest price 
declines over the sample period (Chart 8), shows the greatest 
growth of any category and accounts for a striking 26 percent of 
8  National Bureau of Statistics of China, Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 
China Statistical Yearbook, various years.
9  See Amiti and Freund (forthcoming) for more details on China’s export growth.
10  Under the United Nations’ Standard International Trade Classiﬁ  cation system, 
these are one-digit categories, with the shift from the one-digit category 8 (other 
manufactures) to the one-digit category 7 (machinery).
Source: Forsan.
Chart 9
Total Costs for a Chinese Boot Manufacturer











Source: Bureau van Dijk, Oriana data set.
Note: The sample contains 7,900 firms.
Chart 10
Histogram of Wages as a Share of Total Sales Value 
for Chinese Exporting Firms
Share of wage bill paid
Share of exporters
Firms where wages were more 
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consumer goods. The implication of this development is that the 
mix of imports from China has moved in the direction of prod-
ucts whose prices are falling, not rising.
Conclusion
What forces reversed the downward trend in import prices from 
China, leading to a 6 percent increase over the last two years? Our 
new import price index, which permits a breakdown by product 
type, casts fresh light on the causes of the upturn. In particular, 
it shows that the largest increases in import prices were in 
industrial supplies, with only moderate increases in consumer 
and capital goods prices.
These observations in turn help us to evaluate the underlying 
factors that may have driven the increases in import prices. For 
example, while improvements in the quality of Chinese exports 
are surely ongoing and could have led to an overstatement of 
actual price rises, it is hard to see why the quality upgrading 
would be concentrated in industrial supplies. Moreover, although 
wage growth is a reality in China, for a large range of ﬁ  rms the 
labor component of costs is just too small to explain the change 
in price trends. 
More persuasive as a source of the increase in import prices 
is the 20 percent appreciation of the renminbi against the dollar. 
The appreciation began in June 2005, coinciding closely with the
rise in import prices for consumer and capital goods in particu-
lar. But while the exchange rate change undoubtedly contributed 
to the upswing in import prices, the factor that best explains the 
very large increases in the import price of Chinese industrial 
supplies is the surge in the prices of oil and other commodities. 
Insofar as import prices of industrial supplies from other coun-
tries also rose with higher commodity prices, it appears that the 
higher import prices examined in this article were not really 
a China-speciﬁ  c effect, but a global phenomenon.
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